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WHY WASN'T THE DAMAGE WORSE? SOME ANSWERS
FROM THE ACADEMIC MIND
Wagner Thielenst
During the era of McCarthyism, between the late 1940s and
mid-1950s, a number of distinguished liberals became convinced
that the McCarthyites' attacks were devastating American higher
education. Thus Robert Hutchins, the renowned former head
of the University of Chicago and then of the Ford Foundation,
wrote articles expressing his belief that those attacks were
crushing the spirit of the academic profession.
Hutchins took a further step: The Fund for the Republic,
which he now led, commissioned Paul Lazarsfeld and the Bureau
of Applied Social Research at Columbia University to carry out
a nationwide empirical research study of the question.
Lazarsfeld, with the help of Robert Merton, Samuel Stouffer,
Edward Shils, and others, worked out a study design that would
permit, in both quantitative and descriptive terms, an exacting
research confirmation of Mr. Hutchins' assertions. If the spirit
of the academic profession was crushed, the study would be able
to show this, in systematic detail.
Lazarsfeld and his staff followed textbook procedure.
Campuses which had been invaded were visited; professors under
attack and others less directly involved were interviewed at
length. From these careful explorations a first draft of a
systematic schedule of questions emerged, which was tested and
refined in more interviews. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues
decided to focus the study on social scientists, the sector of the
professoriate which dealt directly in the classroom with the very
issues over which the McCarthyites and many others in the larger
community were concerned.
In April and May of 1955, a cross section of 2,451 American
social scientists at a cross section of 165 four-year colleges were
interviewed face-to-face by trained interviewers from two leading

t Wagner Thielens, a professor at Columbia University 1975-1994, is now an
independent scholar. Dr. Thielens wishes to thankJohn Grover and Neil Hamilton for
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social-science research organizations. The interview schedule
contained several dozen Yes-No questions. For perhaps fifteen
of these, the interviewers asked for a detailed account, and
recorded the replies.
I joined Lazarsfeld's staff in the early summer of 1955,
planning to interrupt work on my dissertation for three months
to help to prepare a preliminary report to Mr. Hutchins. As it
turned out, I stayed on for three years.
As any thoughtful reader of The Academic Mind would
agree, things did not quite work out as our sponsors had
thought. The study's results made clear that the profession,
though in important ways wounded, was hardly crushed.
In this paper, I will review parts of The Academic Mind data,
but from a different perspective. I will recast a number of the
findings from the book to form the backbone of a four-part
narrative. First, in key ways, the academic profession was
vulnerable all along to attack from the right. Second, during the
late 1940s and early-to-mid 1950s, the attack came, and caused
considerable damage. Third, many signs in our data indicate
that the damage was less severe than liberal authors like Mr.
Hutchins thought certain. Last, I will sketch, provisionally, some
of the forces that mitigated its severity.
I.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS: A VULNERABLE PROFESSORIATE

Two characteristics of the social-science professoriate, I
would suggest, made it vulnerable to attack in the McCarthy era.
I will describe some ramifications of the first, and then point
briefly to the second.
A. A Profession to the Left of Center
In the 1950s, the social-science sector of America's
professoriate was somewhat to the left of the public in its politics.
A comparison of voting patterns for the two makes the difference clear. In 1948, 63% of our social-science voters chose
Truman and 28% chose Dewey. Nationally, Truman won by just
4%. But if social scientists alone had settled the election,
Truman would have beaten Dewey by more than two to one. In
1952, Eisenhower swept Stevenson by 54% to 44%. Social

1.

PAUL F. LAZARSFELD &WAGNER THIELENS, JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND (1958).
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scientists, in contrast, chose Stevenson by 65% to 34%, converting the Eisenhower victory to a Stevenson landslide. We should
note that if social scientists' votes had actually prevailed in that
era, Senator McCarthy and other figures active in the
McCarthyite movement would quite possibly never have been
elected, and would certainly not have dominated the various
legislative committees on un-American activities they made into
weapons aimed at academe.2
To be sure, the social scientists were aware of their differences from the public. Some 67% of the sample considered
themselves "more liberal" than most people in the community
where their college was located. Even on the campus, 39% of
these professors thought they were more liberal than most of the
faculty, and 51% more liberal than the school's administration.
These findings already suggest that such differences might make
social scientists vulnerable as well to difficulties with colleagues
and administrators inside their campus itself.
If only social scientists' voting had separated them from the
larger community and the rest of the campus, their vulnerability
might not have been great. But professors' views on key political
questions of the day were also at issue. In particular, the manysided problems of coping with American Communism in the
Cold War-of how to think about it and how to deal with it-raised
numerous questions. In 1954, a survey by Samual Stouffer
examined the nation's views on these questions. Since a hyperpatriotic stance on Communism had fueled the McCarthyite
attacks on academe, Lazarsfeld's interviews repeated verbatim a
number of the Stouffer queries.
To deal with Communists who were spies or saboteurs ready
to infiltrate a defense industry, social scientists by and large
agreed with the general public: they should be exposed and
rooted out. But where nothing more than a set of personal
beliefs was involved, the social scientists were more permissive.
While fully 68% of the public said "a clerk in a shoe store who

2. The size of the differences between the social scientists' voting figures and the
public's does not tell us how far social scientists were to the left of the public. They
show that social scientists were somewhere to the left, in the sense that far more of them

were located at the Democratic pole than at the Republican pole, comparatively, and
that by general agreement the Democratic pole was to the left of the Republican pole.
But they say nothing about how far apart the two poles were thought to be in 1948 and
1952.
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is an admitted Communist" should be fired, and 51% of a large
sample of community leaders agreed, just 9% of the social
scientists held this view. While 43% of the Stouffer cross-section
and 37% of the leaders saw American Communists as a great
danger to the United States, only 14% of the social scientists
concurred. From these findings, and others of like import that
I need not repeat here, we understand better why McCarthy and
his brethren sought so obsessively to brand their targets as
Communists. A good share of the public was quite prepared, by
1954, to see those so branded summarily excluded from society.
These findings also help us to understand why the permissive
nature of our respondents' views could leave them vulnerable to
a familiar argument: Since they were unwilling to weed out
Communists in all places, or even see them as uniformly
dangerous, were not these professors perhaps "soft on Communism" and a danger themselves?
Though social scientists were clearly to the left of the public
in aggregate, they were markedly divided among themselves in
their treatment of Communists and other controversial groups.
The most highly permissive, 22% of the total sample, would
allow students who wanted to form a Young Communists League
(YCL)-in 1955!-and would also oppose the firing of a college
teacher who admitted to being a Communist. At the other
extreme, some 14% of the social scientists took a stance that
Lazarsfeld and I termed "clearly conservative": they would not
only ban the YCL and fire the Communist professor, they would
oppose having any teacher "with radical or nonconformist views"
on their social-science staff, and they would ban even a Young
Socialist League.3 Between these two extremes, on our five-part
scale, lay the "quite permissive," the "somewhat permissive," and
the "somewhat conservative" respondents. A sizeable 22% of the
social scientists potentially exposed themselves to the public's
anger, not merely by allowing a Communist to earn a living as a
shoe clerk, but by permitting Communism a two-sided foothold
on campus. Furthermore, another 21% would permit either the
YCL or the Communist teacher. Thus almost half of the sample,

3. I have somewhat oversimplified the index of conservatism used in The Academic
Mind There professors were labelled "clearly conservative" if they banned all
Communists on campus and took at least two of four other comparatively restrictive
positions.
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43%, would directly flout the public's conviction that Communists in America posed a real danger. I believe purely by taking
such a stance, in an era when disagreement and disapproval
could quickly turn into open charges, social scientists made
themselves vulnerable.
Did social scientists share this belief? For certain, 24% knew
of at least one individual who was, as our question put it, "no
longer teaching here as a result of his political views." Doubtless, a similar or greater portion knew of further local cases
where promotion or tenure had been denied, or other penalties
imposed.
Without question, a good number of these professors saw
themselves as vulnerable-sometimes imminently vulnerable-to
attack. They expressed this sense when 20% said they "felt
[their] own academic freedom had been threatened," even
though most had as yet had no specific complaints or charges
made against them, and when 12% had felt they "were being
watched in a classroom," even though most as yet lacked
concrete evidence of such scrutiny.
B. Activists

Our data suggest that social scientists, in particular the most
liberal ones, were vulnerable for a second reason: They were
activists and joiners. Some 30% had been or were presently
members of a political group which, in the interview question's
words, "advocated an unpopular or controversial program or
cause." For a number, these affiliations had already had
consequences: 14% had been criticized for their memberships
and a small but not negligible 2% believed their academic
careers had already been adversely affected because of them.
Not surprisingly, another 5% feared that such might one day
become the case. These percentages sketch in rough outline the
costs of the controversial memberships. We should add that
because these memberships were in general public knowledge,
they established for keeps professors' status as readily-located
McCarthyite targets.'
I should note that professors might be activists in other
ways: they often liked to speak out. Their interviews are

4. The few professors who had secret past memberships, or were alleged to have
them, of course made particularly attractive targets.
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peppered with reports of speeches to the local Rotary Club,
letters to a newspaper editor, talks to a student political organization, and the like. These active involvements were often on
behalf of left-of-center stances and causes. By making such views
public, professors again made themselves more visible to
opponents and more vulnerable. In ordinary times, if an
academic spoke to local Rotarians on the virtues of reducing the
tariff on oranges, he might be applauded or criticized, but little
more would happen. In the McCarthy era, as one respondent
noted, the same speech might prove distinctly dangerous.
II.

THE ATrACKS AND THE DAMAGE THEY CAUSED

During the McCarthyite years, a good number of the
vulnerable social scientists experienced an abrupt transformation, from persons susceptible to possible complaints and charges
to persons against whom complaints and charges were in fact
made.5
In the spring of 1955, when our interviews were conducted,
social scientists described the climate they lived in as much
changed in recent years. Their consensus was that intellectual
activity in America had come under serious threat, and that the
public and groups outside the campus were expressing greater
concern over professors' political opinions and teaching of
political matters. Their school administration was under greater
pressure to avoid controversy, perhaps from the state legislature
and local politicians, perhaps from the community or the
school's trustees. From this climate, the attacks and complaints
developed. In turn, the attacks of course acted to sustain and
intensify the climate.
Our interviews asked both directly and indirectly about
campus incidents, as we called episodes in which respondents or
their colleagues had been the subject of charges, criticisms,
complaints, and the like. If respondents said they had been
reported unfavorably to higher authorities for their political
views, or that someone on campus had been accused of being
subversive or engaging in un-American activities, in each case
our interviewers asked for and recorded the details. Other
questions asked, more indirectly, whether their own academic

5. My account of the McCarthyite attacks and the campus atmosphere of the
period draws upon parts of Chapter II and Appendix 8B in The Academic Mind.
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freedom, or a colleague's, had been threatened in some way.
When professors did find freedoms endangered, or felt other
pressures, interviewers again sought complete information.
All together, the interview offered nine diverse ways for
respondents to record any charges or accusations made against
themselves or other professors on campus, and to tell us about
what ensued. For each college, we pooled all respondents'
replies to compile an incident record for the college. For the
165 schools, we obtained a total of 990 incidents in which some
kind of complaint, charge, or accusatory action was described to
US.
The most widely reported subset of the incidents, which we
might have learned much about from newspaper accounts, were
the "big" episodes. Characteristically, these brought to campus
a legislative committee investigating un-Americanism, making
charges of past affiliation with the Communist Party, "fellow
travelling," disloyalty, or simply "Communism." A single incident
might last for months or even years, result in frequent changes
of fortune for the accused, and stir formal and informal faculty
and administrative groups into action. At the 165 institutions,
perhaps fifty such incidents occurred in the six or seven years
preceding our 1955 campus visits, with approximately twenty-five
professors fired and another seven forced to resign under
pressure.8
The damage extended well beyond these most publicized
cases. In the remaining total of some 940 incidents, more than
150 additional professors were fired, and approximately thirty
others were forced to resign. Most of the incidents at the 165
schools did not have the trappings of the best-known episodes:
no visiting Congressm en, no running newspaper accounts. Just
because they received less attention elsewhere, they all the more
deserve notice here. For this brief account, I will divide them,
over-simply, into the "lesser" incidents and the "small" incidents.

6. These numbers must remain approximate, for several reasons. Respondents
on a campus sometimes gave incomplete accounts of an incident, or disagreed on
particulars. Again, if we had asked more or perhaps different questions, or if we had
interviewed more professors at each college, we would without doubt have learned of
more incidents. We might not discover any additional firings or forced resignations,
but we would doubtless have found more instances of 'lesser" damage to a professor,
such as a promotion withheld, tenure denied, or limitations imposed on teaching or
research, not to mention students shortchanged and finances depleted.
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The lesser incidents, characteristically, were described by
only a fraction of our respondents on campus, often by less than
a quarter. Our count includes perhaps 300 incidents which
belong in this group. I will try to convey something of their
flavor with a single example. By coincidence, one professor had
taught at two of the schools in our sample. The first, a university, had hired two former EB.I. agents to investigate accusations
of widespread subversion in the faculty. The professor was
charged with membership in the Young Communist League as
a student, and fired when he refused to cooperate with the
investigation. Employed at another sample school nearby, he
ran into trouble again when the old charges received fresh
publicity. Although this time not formally accused, he became
a target for community recrimination. "Neighborhood children," a colleague recalled, "were told it was all right to throw
stones at his children and call him a Commie." Repugnant as
this episode is, we can take some comfort that no children were
apparently injured, and that the resilient professor was able to
find work at a third college some distance away.
Appropriately, the "small" incidents were with few exceptions minimally reported. Indeed, more than 600 episodes,
some 62% of the total 990, were described by only one professor.
Quite often these accounts recorded no seriously harmful
outcomes. In some, the charge was dismissed as ridiculous by all
concerned: "A woman who lives nearby came on campus with an
Eisenhower petition for faculty members to sign. A man with a
Russian name refused to sign. So she denounced him as being
a Communist.. . but nobody paid her any attention."7
Sometimes the small caliber of an episode reflected adroit
handling of a potentially explosive situation: One teacher who
had been called a card-carrying Communist was not himself
aware that the incident had occurred. The school authorities
had investigated, found the charge baseless and its instigator a
simple crank, and had not bothered to tell the intended target
about it; the incident was mentioned only by a colleague who
accidentally got wind of it. Occasionally, the one-professor
account reflected a more damage-laden situation: David
Riesman's report in our book describes instances in which
officials at ostensibly cooperative colleges told their faculties to

7.

LAZARSFELD & THIELENS, supra note 1, at 55.
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answer our questions but not to mention a particular episode,
and we heard of it only because a renegade teacher broke
silence. Of course, the several hundred small incidents included
numerous other incidents that had repellent
outcomes-promotions denied, warnings, and the rest.
III.

THE DAMAGE COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE

The Academic Mind data thus gave added substance to a view
that was already widely held in 1958 when our book was
published McCarthyite attacks on academe were numerous, and
often injurious to their targets. I want now to set forth a
corollary view that was not often held in 1958, and was not set
forth in The Academic Mind. I will employ only data which
appear in the book, but with a different stress. To me, these
data show that the damage caused by McCarthyite charges and
attacks was not as total or extensive as many feared at the time,
and as our study was originally expected to demonstrate.
One professor unjustly fired is of course one too many.
Even a few teachers unjustly denied tenure, or censured for
membership in controversial organizations, or forced by political
expediency to limit student speech in classrooms, are still too
many. By such standards, the total damage was great, and
irreparable. But to conclude that the spirit of the academic
profession was crushed, or that all of social science was seriously
hurt, I believe, is to considerably distort and exaggerate the
situation we actually found in 1955.
The condition of social science at large should appear
clearly mirrored in the condition of the 2,451 social scientists we
interviewed. They comprised a large and representative crosssection of the full social science community, so their attitudes
and experiences should closely resemble those of social science
as a whole, but in microcosm.
If we were to focus only on the big episodes our respondents described, we might well conclude that American social
science in 1955 was engulfed in attacks. A considerable number
of big incidents did occur on the 165 campuses, and I do not
want to minimize the misery and hurt that they collectively
caused. But to focus only on them, and to draw conclusions
about American social science based only on them, is to make
them the total story, instead of a fraction.
Let us stick here to the real totality. First, let us find out
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how many of the respondents-what portion of the microcosm-were themselves the object of an incident. As it proved,
exactly 11.1% of these men and women said they themselves had
been criticized, threatened, reported, or charged. Because of
possible sampling error, and because our questions were possibly
not inclusive enough, or perhaps even too suggestive, a sensible
view of our data suggests that between 9% and 14% of all social
scientists were targets of charges or threats during the McCarthy
era. I should add that only 2.3% of the sample members
recorded a personal incident that was also mentioned by at least
one other respondent. That is, fewer than one in forty of the
2,451 professors had been the subject of an episode of sufficient
substance or gravity to be known and recounted by one or more
of their several colleagues whom we also interviewed.' These
figures show convincingly that social science was far from a
profession under wholesale siege.
Even an especially vulnerable subgroup, the respondents
who were members of controversial political groups, were by no
means enveloped in personal difficulties. Just 14% of these
members said they were subjects of incidents, and 4%, one in
every twenty-five, were targets whose incidents had sufficient heft
to be described by another interviewee. True, as noted earlier,
16% were worried that their membership still might someday
harm their careers. At least for these professors, in April or May
of 1955, the ill effects of McCarthyism could still lie ahead; they
did not know, as we do now, that the attacks were coming to an
end.
To mention worry is to cross into a different aspect of
McCarthyism. A central goal of the Academic Mind research was
to explore the possibility that because of the incursions of the
McCarthyites into the campus world, social scientists were
experiencing widespread "political anxiety," as we initially termed
it. They were suffering debilitating concern that something from
their personal past, or something they said in class, or something
in their speech to the Rotary Club, could lead to trouble. A life
permeated with such concerns and worries would be a damaged
life, even if no charges, warnings or complaints should come

8. The proportion of personal incidents that were known to any colleagues,
interviewed or not, can be estimated from our data, but only recorded accurately by
interviewing all of those colleagues.
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their way.
To gauge professors' general state of political worry, the
interviews contained a number of indicator questions about
specific situations that might have arisen and caused alarm. A
professor's combined replies about these indicator situations
gave a9 rough but useful gauge of his or her more generalized
worry.
But I want to focus here on the absence of worry, to stress
our evidence that the situation could clearly have been worse.
True, 40% of our respondents had "worried about the possibility
that some student might inadvertently pass on a warped version
of what [they had] said and lead to false ideas" about their
political views. But this meant that 60%, half again as many, had
not worried about the possibility. That so many should feel this
concern was bad, I agree. We should still notice that even more
did not feel it. On a second indicator, 63% had not "ever found
[themselves] wondering if because of their politics or something
political they said or did that they might be a subject of gossip
in the community." Again, a sizeable majority had not worried.
On a third indicator, 63% had not "wondered, if [they] were
considering a move to another college, whether that college
would ask anyone at their present college about their political
background and the political biases they might have in their
teaching." Even in this hypothetical situation, which all but
invited the ventilation of unfocused doubts and hesitations, a
majority did not use the opportunity.
On three further indicators, the absence of worry was still
more widespread: 73% had not "ever wondered" that a political
opinion they had expressed could affect their job security or
chances for promotion, 83% had not "ever thought about the
possibility" that the administration of their college kept a
political file or dossier on faculty members, and 84% had not
"ever wondered" if their political comments had offended
alumni.
Any one of the six queries could arguably be discounted, as

9. In The Acadmic Mind, worry was melded together with caution (discussed
below) to become "apprehension," the analysis of which was central to our report.
In the second year of our data analysis, Lazarsfeld and I changed our principal
label for professors' individual response to McCarthyism from "anxiety" to the milder
"apprehension." This change reflected our growing recognition that McCarthyite
attacks were not as damaging to professors as we had first thought.
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too specific or too iffy to be reliable.1" But when these queries
repeatedly record that a definite majority of professors had not
wondered about each matter, the consistent pattern is telling.
Taken as a whole, social scientists in the McCarthy era were not
a profession plagued by pervasive unease and discomfort.
A. ForestallingWorry
A significant possibility requires attention: Perhaps social
scientists were no longer worried because, though once vulnerable, they had now drawn in their horns. Perhaps they had
simply limited or stopped the activities that had once made them
vulnerable.
We thus needed to find out whether professors had done
something to forestall the situations which might cause them
concern. Indeed, some had. Two of the ten chapters in The
Academic Mind record in detail the various ways in which
individual professors had developed increased "caution," as we
termed it. Notwithstanding, five interview questions put the
entire sample on record, and shows that the forestallers were a
small minority.
In discussing these diverse actions, at least those which
involved constraints on basic professional behavior, I believe we
need a higher standard. If a quarter or third of all social
scientists are worried that students might convey a warped view
of their teaching to school authorities, but change nothing in
their behavior, the damage is minor. But if the same quarter or
third alter assigned readings on a controversial subject to
exclude works that might be criticized, or tone down their
writings to avoid political controversy, the matter is more serious.
Core professional activities are now clearly more circumscribed,

10. Furthermore, slight changes in the wording of a question can sometimes
substantially change the replies to it. In a famous example, 43% of one large polled
group said they approved of "the President's" foreign policy, while among a matched
group, 63% said they approved of "President Roosevelt's" policy.
But when six separate questions about various worry situations all produced a
majority of respondents saying they had not worried, the possibility that our conclusion
is an artifact of question wording becomes negligible.
11. Neither did social scientists record accumulated worries in another manner.
Just 53% of the 2,451 professors had worried about at most one of the six. In the
troubled McCarthy era, surely, an occasional spate of worry was only normal. If so, this
figure shows that a majority of social scientists were well-removed from consuming
apprehensiveness.
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and the damage is great.
The interview asked about two of these core possibilities-and I am of two minds about the results. In one, 12% of
the sample members said they did "find in [their] recommendations of reference materials to students" that they were "more
careful today not to recommend something that might later be
criticized for being too controversial."12 The other 88% said
they had not retreated in this way. Should we conclude that
since a large majority had not caved in to McCarthyite pressures,
the damage was not great? Or should we insist that if this many
had modified their teaching in such a way, the whole profession
had been compromised? I think there is much to be said for
both views.
On the second matter, 9% said they had "toned down
[something] they had written lately because [they] were worried
that it might cause too much controversy." The figure rises only
to 10% among those who were most productive in their writing.
Again I am of mixed mind: Should we conclude that the writing
effort of all social scientists had been seriously impaired, or not?
All together, in the two professional matters, at least one
conclusion seems fair: The situation was bad, but could have
been much worse. Assuming the fact that 12% (or 14%) had
sanitized their reading lists meant the whole profession was
compromised, if 30% or 40% had done so the compromise
would be far worse.
The remaining three caution matters dealt with constraints
which are professionally less central. I feel no ambivalence in
reporting that fully 73% of our respondents did not as individuals "occasionally go out of [their] way to make statements or tell
anecdotes in order to bring home the point directly or indirectly
that [they] have no extreme leftist or rightist leanings," that fully
78% had not "occasionally refrained from expressing an opinion
or participating in some activity in order not to embarrass the
trustees or the college administration," and that fully 82% had
not found themselves "being more careful now and then not to
bring up certain political topics with [their] colleagues in order

12. When respondents added comments of their own to this checklist-reply
question, a small number tended to modify or even contradict their "did not act more
carefully" answer. A fair estimate would find 13% or 14% more careful in this matter.
Similar comments to the question on "toning down" of writings, discussed next,
make appropriate a similar upward adjustment.
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not to embarrass them." For these large majorities, even such
comparatively minor gestures towards self-protection, or towards
polite avoidance of embarrassing others, had never seemed
necessary. When so many felt no need for the three precautions,
we can once more say without reservations that in these professionally less central matters, social scientists were not plagued by
pervasive inhibitions on their behavior.
B.

CautiousActivism

Our findings contain a different kind of evidence against
such inhibitions: they show that caution tended instead to go
along with activism. For instance, among those who showed no
signs of caution, just 9% were current members of a controversial organization, while among those who reported two or more
signs, an appreciably greater 20% were members. By several
other indications, activism was at least as common among the
most cautious professors as among the least, and in most
instances more so.1
The apparent contradiction in the finding about cautious
activism-the fact that professors who took the most steps to
avoid controversy also most frequently had controversial
involvements-disappeared when we looked at these professors'
volunteer remarks. For some, it was a question of different
standards for their behavior on campus than in the larger
community. They saw the campus as welcoming political activity,
and a quiet protest through channels could be effective; the
outside world was more suspicious, so a more public protest
might only backfire. Again, some professors tried to save their
ammunition; they sought to be more restrained than usual in
certain situations, so they could be more aggressive than usual
in others.

13. To be exact, Appendix 8D of The Academic Mind shows that, for seven separate
measures of activism, in five instances professors with the highest accumulated
caution--scores of four or five-were more active than those with the lowest score of
zero; in one instance they were about the same, and in one, less active. This result itself
requires a cautionary note: There were clear signs, as shown in both Appendix 8D and
Figures 4-2 through 4-4 of The Academic Mind,that this activism may have peaked among
the professors whose caution was moderate, and might then have tailed off considerably
if caution reached a level beyond our measures. Cautious activism, our data hint, had
its limits.
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IV. TOWARDS AN EMPERICAL ASSESSMENT OF FORCES LIMITING
THE MCCARTHYITE DAMAGE

If an attack has only moderate success, either it was not
made strongly enough for greater success, or it met strong
opposition-or both. Why the attack was not stronger is not my
task here to conjecture. My interest is to understand the strong
opposition. What follows, more exactly, is an effort to lay a
foundation of the Academic Mind materials which provide the
beginnings of an empirically grounded comprehension of that
opposition.
A.

The Persona of the Liberal Academic
A number of liberal social scientists' attitudes, views and
behavior patterns formed the parts of a characteristic personality
structure-a persona-which I believe worked in several ways to
limit the success of the McCarthyite attack. A series of findings
from The Academic Mind, brought together, provide a beginning
empirical sketch of this persona.
B.

The Components of the Persona
The situation facing the academic world in 1955 determined
the parts of a professor's life that we should include in the
persona. The McCarthyites made Communism the enemy they
sought to rout from academe. I conceive of a relevant persona,
comprised of the full array of a professor's beliefs and behaviors
which had pertinence, of whatever kind, when faculties faced
McCarthyism; we can disregard all the professor's other attributes. At the very center of this persona, at the heart of the
center, must be placed a professor's beliefs and involvements
with Communism. Indeed, since McCarthyism was above all a
political occurrence, we had best put a professor's full set of
political beliefs and behaviors within the center, as potentially of
special importance.
C. The Heart
We need to return to matters made familiar in earlier pages.
Empirically, the two interview expressions of tolerance towards
campus Communism represent our liberal respondents' more
general views on the matter: their willingness to accept a student
Young Communist League and to allow an admitted Communist
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to continue teaching. As noted, 543 permissive professors held
both opinions. These tolerant men and women, as much as any
grouping we can demarcate statistically deserve to be called the
liberal core of our 2,451 respondents. They embody the
persona's heart. We will term them LLs, for short. Ideologically
furthest from them were the 352 clearly conservative social
scientists, the least tolerant grouping our interview questions
made feasible (for short the CCs). 14
D. The Inclusive Center of the Persona

The LLs held other liberal views and acted in other liberal
ways that belong in the intellectual and behavioral center of the
persona. Liberalism, in my lifetime, has always encompassed an
array of beliefs; 5 in 1955, characteristically, the liberal persona
included much more than permissiveness towards Communism.
Very much in the center, the liberals were Democrats.
Almost all of the LLs, 91%, had voted Democratic in the 1952
election, in contrast to just 31% of the CCs (in shorthand: LL
91%, CC 31%). The same professors the McCarthyites might
label un-American had with few exceptions participated in an allAmerican political event, by voting for a mainstream American
party in an American presidential election. They could justifiably look at themselves as good citizens, people who took a
normal part in the American political process. I would guess,
too, that when they would allow a political minority to voice its
beliefs, they again saw themselves as citizens carrying on the
American heritage of free speech.
Thus, the breadth of the persona's center served LLs as a
moral shield. When the McCarthyites challenged the liberals'
permissive views on Communism, they were challenging a larger
liberal spirit, anchored in participation in basic American politics
and belief in basic American values. The LLs, secure in their
patriotism, could meet the McCarthyite onslaught feeling upright
and untainted.
Again in the center, the LLs often considered themselves as
"politically more liberal than most of the faculty here" (LL 57%,
14. The three intermediate groupings, of 505, 697 and 354 respondents, remained
intermediate in all that follows. For simplicity of presentation, they will not be
mentioned repeatedly.
15. Of course, no two liberals need share identical beliefs, nor give equal weight
to those they share. They may even disagree on some matters, and still both be liberals.
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CC 20%). Surely they meant here too that they were good
Democrats and strong devotees of free speech, not the adherents
of shady disloyalties that the McCarthyites would make them. To
be more liberal than others was a virtue, not a problem.
In objective terms, we possess an indication of the LLs'
position in a political comparison, here to the public: 91% had
voted for Stevenson in 1952, in sharp contrast to 45% of the full
electorate. It was a political fact, not a belief or value, that the
LLs were far more often located in the liberal position. However
far the Democratic pole is to the left of the Republican pole,
many more Ls were located there. We should also take
advantage of these bits of hard data to acquire a sense of the
CCs' political anchorage. Just 31% of the CCs voted Democratic,
substantially fewer than the LLs. In the aggregate, perhaps
surprisingly, they were noticeably to the right of the public. And
the LLs, as a grouping, differed more from the CCs than they
did from Americans as a whole.
Two further findings about professors' political views also
belong in the persona's center. Early in the McCarthy years,
many state legislatures passed laws requiring teachers at public
colleges to sign a special loyalty oath. Those unwilling to sign
were often fired.16 After a long and heated discussion, by 1955
the issue was for many settled. Liberals, though, had not
forgotten, and remained all but uniformly opposed to oaths (LL
3%, CC 52%). Perhaps they still heeded the arguments against
a seemingly innocuous statement of loyalty-arguments that a
special oath for teachers alone that questioned teachers' loyalty
was morally wrong, that those who were in fact disloyal would
not hesitate to lie, and so on. By remaining opposed to the
oath, liberals brought directly to the fore their loyalty to, and
regard for, their profession.
This loyalty was underlined in the liberals' reply to an
interview question about dealing with McCarthyite charges: If a
member of the faculty was "accused of being subversive or of
engaging in un-American activities," which was more important
for the college administration to protect, "the reputation of the
college or the rights of faculty members?" A large majority of

16. In 1949 through 1950 at the University of California, 31 faculty members were
dismissed for their refusal to sign. NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND AcADEMIc FREEDOM

25 (1995).
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liberals put professional prerogatives foremost (LLs 80% pro
faculty rights, CCs 46%).
Infused with this kind of belief in the faculty's integrity and
focal place in the university, the liberal persona is better
equipped to withstand intellectually the premise of faculty "unAmericanism" so useful to McCarthyites. Indeed, liberals could
turn for support to an established body of thinking about the
faculty's prepotent role in the liberal intellectual system of
academe and the central importance of academic freedom in
maintaining that role. 7
E. Alert and Forewarnedof Danger
Set outside the center of the persona, but integral to it, were
a number of well-attached parts. Their sequence here tells a
substantive story, but with one exception, none held a place in
professors' lives that was prior to the others.
Liberals were alert to issues of academic freedom and civil
liberties. They followed news of civil liberties problems more
widely than conservatives, and discussed these problems more
widely with friends and colleagues: 70% of the LLs expressed a
strong interest in civil liberties in both of these ways, compared
to 42% of the CCs. The liberals were also regular readers of at
least one of the three current leading liberal magazines, The
Reporter, The New Republic, and The Nation (LL 62%, CC 13%).8
These interests undoubtedly have other meanings to
professors.
But I believe they also cut down McCarthyite
damage, because they helped professors stay tuned to the
threatening climate of the times. Their reading and discussing
were continuing reminders to campus liberals that, so to speak,
they were living in tornado country, and should be on the alert
for tornado warnings.
Some professors found themselves already under more
immediate duress. This in part resulted from the fact that
liberal professors, as noted earlier, considered themselves
politically more liberal than others. In consequence, a number
had "felt pressure to conform to the prevailing political pattern"

17. See i&.at 159-64 (depicting the nature of the liberal academic system and the
vital importance of academic freedom to it).
18. As their "periodical dealing with politics or public affairs," conservatives were
more partial to Time Magazine (LL 38%, CC 70%).
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(LL 30%, CC 7%).19 However good they might feel as liberals,
important others wanted them to become more ordinary.
Liberals also found the climate ominous in another way: a
number believed that within recent years, their "own academic
freedom had been threatened" (LL 32%, CC 7%), even though
no specific episodes or incidents had yet occurred.
In McCarthyite terms, the academic climate was full of storm
warnings. On some campuses the storms-even tornadoes-had
arrived. Liberals, I believe, had the advantage of a special
alertness to this climate and awareness of its potential direct
impact on their lives. Alerted, they could look about for clearer
signs of the storm's severity and nearness. And they could
attempt to prepare themselves, to brace themselves mentally and
to think about ways to protect and defend themselves.
F

Attacks, Charges, Complaints

Reading the literature on McCarthyite attacks against
professors, I sometimes sense a latent assumption: that the
attacks caused nothing but damage, or almost nothing. The
charges were only hurtful. I want to consider here some possible
benefits the attacks could have had for liberals.
Liberals were the most likely targets of incidents: As one
concrete example, three times as many said specifically that their
views on a political subject had been "reported unfavorably to
higher authorities" than conservatives (LL 21%, CC 7%). I
would guess that they were also more likely-per dozen reports-to suffer hurtful consequences.
But I would further guess that a real number of liberals
emerged from such episodes bloodied but unbowed. The
general tenor of the findings reported to this point, in which for
example cautious activism was predominant, would well fit such
a mixed outcome. Unless they had suffered a mortal blow, the
liberals would have gained combat experience that was bound to
be valuable in future skirmishes and battles.2 °

19.

The interview question asked professors who considered themselves either"more

liberal" or "more conservative" than other faculty members (or than school administrators, et cetera) and whether they had felt pressures to conform. More generally, the
interview schedule provided numerous opportunities for conservatives to describe
themselves as the target of charges and accusations.
20. Our research, very unfortunately, could not systematically reach those who had

suffered a "mortal" blow, on one of our 165 campuses, by being fired or otherwise

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996

19

William Mitchell
Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
WILLM /JTCHFELLLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 22

In similar vein, the liberals were particularly aware of
incidents that had occurred on their campuses. Because liberals
were concentrated at schools with larger numbers of incidents,
and conservatives at schools with few, we must hold the actualities constant. So let us consider only colleges with the low count
of one, two or three corroborated incidents, those described by
at least two respondents. At these low-count colleges, on average
each liberal described almost twice as many incidents as each
conservative did (LL 0.67 incidents, CC 0.36).
Liberals thus not only encountered more attacks themselves,
but also noticed more of the attacks their colleagues experienced. More seasoned in combat themselves, they were more
aware of the scope and nature of the combat which took place
around them. As a part of the persona-of relevant liberal
beliefs and experiences-this savvy should have had obvious
value in encounters with McCarthyism.
How actively did liberals defend themselves, once attacked?
Did they go to the defense of colleagues under fire? Earlier, I
described the liberals as activists, who frequently belonged to a
controversial political organization (LL 49%, CC 8%). It was
also true that one-fifth of the organization members had been
targets of incidents. But on the whole, our interviews inquired
little into professors' responses to actual attacks. Hypothetical
questions asked how they would react if Owen Lattimore were
invited to speak on campus but banned by the school president,
or if the debating team wanted to debate the admission of Red
China to the U.N. but was also banned. Professors were asked
whether they thought their colleagues would "rally to [their]
support" if they were accused of leftist leanings. But the
interview did not ask how they had responded to real complaints
or charges against either themselves or their colleagues. I have
shown that liberals were alert to attacks, and veterans of attacks,
but I cannot say what they actually did once attacks came. 1
forced to leave the campus. The professors who became our sample members were by
definition survivors, member of the current faculty listed in a school's catalog.
I do report that 585 professors, 24% of our 2,451, did "know of someone who is
no longer teaching here as a result of his political views." How many individuals they
had in mind, how many of these appear in our record of incidents, how many moved
before they could become targets, I cannot say. My sense is that their inclusion would
darken the account given in this paper somewhat, but not substantially.
21. I am mindful that more than one student of the McCarthy era has concluded
that few professors, liberal or not, came forward once attacks occurred and help was
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G. A Liberal's Approach to Teaching
Turning away from the expressly political components of the
persona, I want to describe three interlinked views that underlay
the liberals' approach to teaching. First, the liberals stressed
their desire to train even undergraduates "to make their own
original contribution" to help society improve (LL 50%, CC
32%). They not only sought themselves to "help society better
meet the needs of its people," but also believed they could assist
students to take part in the process. Second, liberals thought
that since almost all "areas in the social sciences [are] subject to
differences of opinion.., such controversial matters should be
discussed frequently in undergraduate teaching because of the
educational value of such discussion" (LL 82%, CC 54%).
Controversy is integral and ever present in the world which
social science studies, so discussion of controversial topics is ever
necessary in the classroom. Third, liberal professors would
naturally emphasize "[getting] students thinking about the
problem areas" in a subject more than "[giving them] a basic
grounding of facts" in the subject. Indeed, these stereotyped
phrases brought liberals and conservatives to their sharpest
disagreement about education: 68% of the LLs, but just 28% of
the CCs, made problem areas salient. On the first page of The
Academic Mind, Paul Lazarsfeld declared that "[o] ur intention was
to include those teachers who were likely to deal with controversial topics in their courses."' The teachers he might particularly have had in mind were the liberal social scientists whose
educational philosophy I have just sketched.
This teaching approach could have worked in a number of
ways to blunt the impact of McCarthyite charges. Some social
science professors could have chosen McCarthyite attacks on
academe for discussion in class, as part of their course segment
on extremist politics or the social problems of democratic
societies, to think about the problem aloud, to enlist the support
and ideas of their students, or to work up particularly abhorrent
needed. Thus Schrecker states that professors "did not organize, they did not protest,
they did not do anything that reversed the tide of dismissals." ELLEN W. SCHRECKER,
No IvORY TOWER 308 (1986). What was needed was "massive protest activity." Id. at
314. I am not sure Schrecker would consider the series of questions I attempt to
address in this paper, about less heroic responses which only mute attacks, as useful.
22.

LAZARSFELD & THIELENS, supra note 1, at 3.
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or ridiculous parallels. If this seemed rash, or too remote from
their subject, their familiarity with social controversy in its many
forms should have helped put McCarthyism into a more
manageable perspective, perhaps by providing parallels, perhaps
by calling up examples-specifics from the Salem witchcraft
trials, analogies to the craze for hula hoops-to help persuade
dubious administrators or department chairmen.
The kind of intellect displayed here should also be useful.
A mind that could relish the workings of controversy, and enjoy
life on a discipline's frontiers, would know that a frontiersman's
lot brings pain and requires endurance.
H. Productivity and Outside Respect
Perhaps reflecting their greater involvement in the problem
areas of their disciplines, liberals were the most professionally
productive professors. At every age level, they had written more
articles and published more books in their fields: Among those
forty or younger, more liberals had comparatively high productivity (LL 34%, CC 18%); they held the same advantage in their
forties (LL 65%, CC 41%), and again after they had passed fifty
(LL 73%, CC 52%). Among their disciplinary colleagues, this
tells us that liberals had achieved more recognition at every
career stage. When McCarthyites attacked a liberal, chances
were good they attacked a person known in measure and
respected, and hardly viewed as a prioriin the wrong.
Another sign that liberals might be well regarded outside
the campus was their success as consultants. Somewhat more
than conservatives (LL 40%, CC 27%), they were acknowledged-and paid-for their expertise as sociologists and political
scientists, often by the conservative world of business. However
the community at large might disagree with their views about
Communism, or directly challenge those views, liberals in
number had developed working ties with key parts of that
community.
I.

Power on Campus

Liberals did not stand out in the official power structure at
their colleges. Among social scientists aged fifty-one or more,
liberals were now (or had been) head of their department only
as often as conservatives (LL 58%, CC 59%), and among
younger respondents, less often (7% of LLs and 23% of CCs
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aged forty or less).2 Approximately half of all chairmen had
a "considerable amount of latitude and authority in making
policy decisions," according to respondents. Doubtless, many
supportive chairmen had a hand in dealing with and even
resolving pressures or charges against a department member,
particularly when no public spotlight as yet shone on the
professor. Though liberals did not have the advantage of
favorable numbers, in comparison to conservatives, they were
nonetheless quite well represented in departmental front offices.
Liberals in special number did hold another kind of campus
affiliation: more of them belonged to the school's chapter of the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) (LL 58%,
CC 34%). Our interview questions, unfortunately, did not ask
how helpful teachers found this tie. For this paper, I have
ordinarily not drawn on other authors' accounts of the McCarthy
years. But their descriptions and judgments on the AAUP would
be useful here.

J. A Middle-Class Background
Usually, for any pair of persona elements, influence could
flow in both directions: Attacks could make a professor realize
that he was more liberal than colleagues, being more liberal
could bring attacks. In one case, that of family background,
influence could only flow from past to present.
Liberal professors, like many of their colleagues in academe,
came unusually often from comfortable middle-class origins. Of
the full 2,451, 48% had fathers who were proprietors, managers,
officials, or members of a profession; only a small fraction of
Americans as a whole had similar beginnings. Some of our
liberal professors had broken away from a background in the
business community, and from its conservative credo; perhaps
they had done well at intellectual pursuits in college, or developed an interest in an academic discipline, or even just rebelled.
Others, the children of professionals or in some cases academics,
had often grown up in an atmosphere of liberal ideas. In many
instances, I would assume, professors who were liberals in 1955
had been liberals for all or most of their adult lives; they had

23. Though our question did not ask separately about present and former
chairmen, I have no reason to believe the proportion of sitting chairmen who were
liberals declined drastically during the McCarthy years.
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begun to develop the liberal persona as young adults, or earlier.
There were of course changes: A small number had flirted with
the Communist Party in the 1930s, but long left it behind; Henry
Wallace as a candidate for president had come and gone; and I
would presume that, for many, the McCarthyites' loud focus on
Communism brought the whole matter greater salience.
I believe liberals' middle-class origins helped them in several
ways. They were people who spent Thanksgiving at the homes
of parents who themselves had gone home for Thanksgiving; in
these bedrock terms they could never be called un-American. If
the liberal core remained basically unaltered, its assumptions and
thought processes-illustrated in our materials about educational
beliefs-would be steadfast.
The core would have deep
roots--grafted, perhaps, but strong-leaving liberals unshakable,
certain who they were. This sense of unshaken identity came
through clearly in interview after interview. It made professors
energetic, not tired; angry, not fearful.
A practical note deserves mention: undoubtedly some
professors from upper-middle-class origins had inherited money.
Though seldom rich, they could hire a lawyer more readily, and
earlier in the game. Their background, too, lay in a world
where lawyers play a useful and familiar part.
K

The Liberal Personal,In Sum

As individuals, liberals like other people are never exactly
alike. I would be amazed if any two professors gave identical
answers to the twelve or fifteen questions which statistically
delineate the liberal. Even if so, each gave special personal
shadings to his views.
Yet I am sure that the liberal professors who took part in
our research were alike in important ways. They characteristically voted Democratic, taught frontier issues in class, joined
controversial organizations, and so on. More exactly, though
none thought and did all of these things, all thought and did
many of them. Further, throughout this paper we have added
to the bare bones of these questionnaire replies the flesh of
understandings and interpretations. Here again, none of the
liberal professors had all of this flesh, but all of them had a good
share of it. In possessing such marked if inexact patternings of
relevant traits, professors possessed a liberal persona.
I have attributed a persona to professors, rather than simply
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listing and discussing their pertinent traits, because I believe
that-to repeat an earlier point in a larger context-the whole
of professors' liberal nature had greater impact than the sum of
its parts. This larger impact was of three kinds. First, the
persona was so capacious and well-established in liberal social
scientists' complete being, that when their present tolerance of
Communism (or past dealings with it) came under pressure or
attack, the assault was directed against only a small sliver of the
whole, leaving their liberalism in essence unnoticed and
untouched. When they needed to, they could deploy it virtually
intact. The facts and issues of Communism, to them, were a
meaningful but far from all-consuming matter, and I doubt that
the McCarthyites changed this, even though obviously the
McCarthyite version of these issues could acquire giant significance. Communism was not often one of the contributions to
society that professors taught to students, the controversial
organizations they belonged to had left-of-center goals but little
attraction to political extremism. Democratic politics held real
interest but the politics of the American Communist Party held
almost none. The qualities of mind that liberals brought to
these views could be brought to bear, intellectually intact, on the
new controversy, the organized zealotry, the eccentric Republicanism, they now needed to face.
Second, since the persona had a good number of component elements, professors could produce a variety of responses
to the McCarthyites. They had options, not always conscious, to
select one response or another, or both, or a third. As one
option, they could draw on their knowledge of social controversies; as another, they could call a lawyer. Or they could decide
to do both-and with luck, both moves would profit from the
pairing. Third, and perhaps partly because they had more
options, professors had a powerful weapon at their disposal. The
total persona was formidable-hard to take the measure of, hard
to combat effectively, hard to destroy.
Finally, professors as targets had many more look-alikes than
their opponents may have realized. The McCarthyites attacked
as though their targets were an isolated group, be it vaguely
defined: They sought teachers who were Communists and fellow
travellers, but ignored all others. In fact, the professoriate they
faced had quite small gradations of targetdom. If our categories
had produced these gradations, at the forefront would be the
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543 LLs, 22% of the sample, and those most vulnerable for
tolerating two kinds of Communism on campus. But not at all
far behind would come the 505 single liberals, 21% who
tolerated one kind but not the other, and who as targets must
surely be considered close kin. At another small intellectual
remove stood another 114 (5%) who would tolerate one kind of
Communist, bar the other, and also oppose, for example, the
Young Socialists or the A.D.A. The McCarthyites-and here I
include everyone from august senators to cranks living down the
street-actually made charges against 272, 11.1%, of our
representative sample of social scientists. But in the process they
alerted far more, be they my total ideological kin group of 1,162,
47%, or some other large contingent more meaningful to
professors than our question-reply groupings. In a curious way,
the McCarthyites took on a much larger segment of the social
science professoriate than they could possibly have intended.
V. INSTITUTIONAL DETERRENTS

Just as the liberal persona of social scientists was the manysided trait that helped them as individuals to survive and blunt
the McCarthyite onslaught, in the provisional blueprint I offer
here, so the quality of their institutions helped them as faculties
to survive these attacks.
Chapter VII of The Academic Mind presents, I think well, our
findings on school quality and other institutional deterrents to
McCarthyite incursions. So I will be content to make a brief
aside, then summarize one set of highlights from our chapter.
A.

Creating "Quality" A Digression

I remember well how the concept of college quality
emerged. In the early stages of our data analysis, we routinely
divided schools according to their cell in our original stratified
sampling design-large public, small public, large private, small
private, large Catholic, small Catholic, and so on-and then
looked at the pattern of replies to the questions: What percents
in each cell felt their academic freedom had been threatened;
what percents had completed a doctoral degree; etc. We soon
noticed that there were regularities. The same cells had the
largest proportions of threatened respondents, and doctorate
holders, and believers in teaching about problems, the same
other cells the smallest proportions. Paul Lazarsfeld one day
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss2/5

26

1996]

et al.: Why Wasn't the Damage Worse? Some Answers from The Academic Mind
ANSWERS FROM ThE AC4DEMIC MIND

mused in a staff meeting that these tabulations seemed to have
consistent fault lines, and that perhaps the latent consistencies
arose from differences in schools' quality. After some months of
trial and error, we put together a measure of quality that
combined six readily available pieces of information about each
of our 165 colleges: the overall size of its library, the number of
books in the library per student, the size of the annual budget
per student, the proportion of PhDs on the faculty, the school's
ability to produce scholars, and (separately for public and private
institutions) the size of the school's tuition fees. Looking at our
respondents, not in terms of their school's size or formal control,
but of their school's quality, a startling number of the interview
replies made sudden sense. Those empty abstractions-the size
of the budget, size of the library, amount of tuition-carried with
them what seemed the whole life of a college.
B. Quality as a Defense
A remarkable table in The Academic Mind shows that within
each of nine familiar college categories, schools with comparatively higher quality ratings were the scene of more academic
freedom incidents during the McCarthy era than those with
comparatively lower ratings. Among the very large public
schools, for instance, the faculty of those with comparatively high
quality scores were attacked by McCarthyites (and others) more
often than the faculty at comparatively weaker schools. The
pattern was identical among small private colleges, among large
Catholic schools, and so on. We could only conclude that what
was really under attack was the quality of American education.
For many who inhabit academe, a supposition will soon
come to mind: The administrators of higher-quality schools were
more practiced at dealing with attacks, and more effective. Our
data offer some beginning information on this, and on a
nationwide basis: When we consider the 165 schools together-it
would be confusing to tell nine separate stories-respondents at
those in the highest quality score range (of four ranges)
described their administrations quite differently than did those
in the lowest. Some 66% of faculty members in the top range,
compared to 44% in the lowest, felt their administrations had
taken a clear stand on matters of academic freedom. The two
inner quarters (as they always should!) fell in between. At least
in their faculties' perceptions, administrators at schools of high
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quality did not just preside over institutions with the largest
libraries and highest tuition, they were also more willing and
able to articulate a position on that core problem which is the
reason for our conference, academic freedom. By inference,
further, a clear stand was more favorable to their faculty than an
unclear stand.
It was again at the quality schools that administrations had
discussed questions of academic freedom in joint meetings with
the faculty (Q1 44%, Q4 22%). Indeed, it was also true that at
the quality schools, the faculty was most powerful-in faculty
eyes-in determining the degree of academic freedom on
campus; as the scale descends, the administration and trustees
take on an ever larger role. 24 David Riesman provides an
example which shows the low regard that administrators at
schools of weak quality could hold for their teachers: At one
benighted college, the president opened all mail addressed to
his faculty, to be sure they heard nothing subversive from the
outside world.
Unfortunately, I cannot say whether support from colleagues
was also a function of school quality; the data are no longer
immediately available. But we do have figures which show that
at schools of the highest quality, these colleagues were often the
highly permissive LLs (Q1 58%, Q4 22%). From what we
already know of the liberal professor, and the liberal persona, I
feel safe in betting that colleagues were indeed most highly
supportive at the colleges of highest quality.
So we come to the bottom line: Though professors at the
top schools were most often attacked, they were better protected
and supported by school administrators, and doubtless also
better served by their colleagues. A distinction of language
probably summarizes the whole situation best. At the best
schools, our respondents reported the most "accusations" (Q1
63%, Q4 20%), and also the most felt "threats" (Q1 35%, Q4
17%). But the gap between the two, the extent by which
accusations exceeded threats, was greatest at the best schools
(Q1 28%, Q4 3%). Professors at the highest-quality schools were
most under attack. Yet, because accusations were so often not
converted into threats, they felt better protected.

24. Here I oversimplify a more complex rating, of "procedural adequacy" in The
Academic Min&
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VI.

ACROSS A NARROW BORDER

Were some of the liberals zealots? As Hamilton says,
"academics are particularly exposed.., to the lust to suppress
others' speech."25 Liberals who hope to make "a contribution
to help society"26 know there will inevitably be others who
vigorously oppose the contribution. Its wisdom, its usefulness,
the research supporting it will all come under attack. The
border between mounting a strong opposition to gain victory
over those others, and trying to suppress what they have to say,
is narrow.

We could not bluntly ask in our interview schedule, "Are
you a zealot?" And no professor who was a zealot would have
admitted it. So I can only guess-a better word would be
assume-that some professors we classified as liberals were
indeed better called zealots.
The instance I best know of came about after the interviewers had left the 165 campuses. Letters and notes appeared in
liberal outlets, expressing outrage and despair that the great Paul
Lazarsfeld and his interview had completely missed the true
awful magnitude of the McCarthy attacks on the authors'
campuses. To defend himself, Paul asked David Riesman for an
independent assessment of the interview's accuracy, large and
small. Paul also made a move I consider brilliant. He asked
four or five of the vociferous faculties to permit him to come
and describe to them our findings about their school. One part
of our staff tallied on counter-sorters the checklist interview
replies at a college, the other pulled together its incident story.
We learned much faster than we might have otherwise how to
reconstruct from twenty-seven interviews a reliable account of the
three large and seventeen small incidents at ZYX College. Paul
took the results to the complainers, and amazed them: How
could he know that the administration had been strong in the M
case, but the faculty alone had carried the day for N! The
complaints ceased abruptly. There was to me real zealotry in the
loud certainty with which some had so immediately demanded
the withdrawal of our data.
When I speak of David Riesman, I remember that once he
25.

HAMILTON,

supra note 16, at xv.

26. LAzARsFELD & THIELENS, supra note 1, at 138.
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turned in his 450-page report, it became my interesting duty to
cut the works of this world-renowned figure down to 230 pages.
His pages in The Academic Mind are remarkable, mixing an
evaluation of the interview's accuracy with a thoroughly rewarding excursion through the arcane world of interviewing. Today,
of course, I would love to read those missing pages.
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